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This paper provides empirical evidence for the importance of institutions in 
determining the outcome of crises on long-term growth. Once unobserved 
country-specific effects and other sources of endogeneity are accounted for, 
political institutions affect growth through their interaction with crises. The 
results suggest that only countries with strong democracies, high levels of 
political competition and external constraints on government can potentially 
benefit from crises and use them as opportunities to enhance long-term output per 
capita and productivity growth.  
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Are financial crises good or bad for long-term growth? Broadly speaking, there are two opposing 
views: while some authors believe that crises have adverse consequences for long-run growth 
because of increased volatility, others believe that they are good because they allow important 
reforms to take place. This paper seeks to provide a unified empirical answer to these seemingly 
contradictory views, emphasizing the role of political institutions and societal learning in the 
aftermath of crises.   
In general, the economic studies that find a negative effect of crises on growth underscore 
their short-run destabilizing effects on macroeconomic variables and link these to the adverse 
effects that output volatility has on long-term growth. This point of view is straightforward: 
crises reduce output, increase uncertainty, drive away investments and produce social tensions 
that hurt growth (see, for example, Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Hausmann and Gavin, 1996; Cerra 
and Saxena, 2007; and Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz, 2001).  
Other authors support the view that crises generate opportunities for delayed reforms to 
take place, and therefore have the potential of improving long run growth performance. Drazen 
(2002) argues that this view, called the “crisis hypothesis”, has become the new orthodoxy in the 
political economy literature. In a historical context, Bordo (2007) argues that crises can be 
“cathartic” when the forces in favor of good economic reforms win over those of the incumbents. 
Overall, this view tends to see crises as a natural and potentially desirable phenomenon in the 
process of development. Much like teenagers, countries may use—and need—crises as 
opportunities to learn, reform and improve their economic and political institutions.
1  
Our view is that economic crises do not occur in an institutional vacuum. Crises are, in 
essence, periods in time when important decisions are made. Whether these will be instrumental 
for long-term growth or not could depend, among other things, on the type of political 
institutions prevailing at the time of a crisis and on the kind of political compromises that this 
institutional set-up delivers. In particular, irrespective of the causes that lead to a crisis (i.e., bad 
policy, bad advice or bad luck), policy responses will be shaped by the incentives and constraints 
                                          
1 A related strand of the literature finds that crises can also be good for long-term growth if they are side-effects of 
growth-enhancing policies such as financial liberalization. According to this view, as long as crises remain rare, 
countries that pursue financial liberalizations may end up better off in the long run. For example, (Rancière, Tornell, 
and Westermann 2005) show that crises can have beneficial long term effects in credit-constrained countries with 
medium levels of property rights and bailouts for creditors.   
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faced by the key political actors during the time of crisis.
2 Our conjecture is that some political 
systems will be more prone than others to deliver good policy responses that help to correct past 
policy mistakes, learn from the crises, and improve long run growth.
3 
Our view is, in essence, very similar to Tommasi (2004). He argues that even though 
crises might facilitate the introduction of some policy reforms, in general, the quality of the 
implementation of those policies, and thus their effectiveness in correcting past mistakes, is 
conditioned by the overall institutional environment of the country.  In particular, he argues that 
whether first-best policies emerge depends on whether the political institutions underlying the 
policy process lead to cooperative behavior. One important contribution of our paper is to 
empirically investigate which are these “good institutions.” 
What specific political institutions can help during crises is a contentious topic. On one 
hand, democracy could help during crises by ensuring that all voices are heard and that 
constraints (checks-and-balances) exist on arbitrary decisions that might unduly impose long-run 
costs on some sectors rather than others.
4  On the other hand, more democracy and public debate 
could mean that governments are unable to decide quickly, prolonging the duration and negative 
consequences of crises. In that context, a strong autocratic government with fewer constraints 
may be desirable to speed up the decision-making process during crises and ensure that reforms 
are introduced.
5 However, more decisiveness does not guarantee that good reforms are 
implemented. If bad reforms are chosen, then the outcome could be worse than under 
democracy. 
Although there is extensive research on the determinants of crises, on how to prevent 
them, and what policies could help with speedy recovery,
6 there is, to the best of our knowledge, 
little empirical research on the role of political institutions in shaping the long-term outcomes of 
                                          
2 See Inter-American Development Bank (2005). 
3 For our purposes, even if no policy change occurs in the aftermath of a crisis, we are still interested in exploring 
what is the effect of this “no-reform” outcome on long run growth.  
4 See for example Rodrik (2000), who argues that democracy facilitates intertemporal cooperation through 
deliberation and rules that that prevent excessive redistribution of income 
5 For example, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) study the optimal level of insulation (less constraints on 
governments) in a model of endogenous political institutions and argue that during times of crises one should 
observe more insulation (i.e. a stronger, less constrained government). Their implication, however, rest on the 
assumption that reforms are ex-ante good for the country and that the crisis does not increase the risks of 
expropriation. 
6 See for example, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2007), Edwards (2004a), Guidotti, 
Sturzenegger and Villar (2004) and Desai (2003).  
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crises. Our main contribution is to employ a dynamic panel growth regression model to assess 
how various political institutions affect the impact of financial crises on long-term growth. 
Our results provide evidence that stronger democratic institutions can greatly mitigate the 
negative effects of crises on long-term growth, while autocratic governments typically amplify 
the negative outcome of crises. These results appear closely linked to how decisions are made 
during times of crisis, as evidenced by the fact that higher levels of government constraints (that 
limit discretionary policy decisions typically linked to vested short-term interests) also have a 
positive impact on growth through their interaction with crises. Additionally, we find that more 
regulated political participation, which provides a more structured political discussion during 
times of crisis, has similar beneficial effects.  
The main policy implication is straightforward: countries with solid democratic 
institutions and stronger checks-and-balances may welcome crises as opportunities to enhance 
growth, but countries with weak political institutions should try to avoid them.
7 A more subtle 
but equally important implication is that the commonly held moral-hazard view, which   
maintains that countries should suffer crises to learn from their mistakes, might be a misleading 
policy prescription if the role of political institutions is ignored.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we compare our results to the 
literature and provide some intuition on a possible theoretical framework. In Section 3 we 
present the data and estimation methodology. In Section 4 we show our main empirical results 
and several robustness tests, and in Section 5 we discuss issues of endogeneity. Finally, Section 6 
provides some conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
 
                                          
7 In the present international context, this means that the current financial troubles in the United States could be 
ultimately good for its long-term growth, as the financial sector corrects some of its past mistakes. At the same time, 
it also makes sense for a country like China to be extremely careful with the pace of its economic reforms, so as not 
to increase the frequency of crises before improving its democratic institutions.  
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2. Literature Review and Organizing Framework 
How do these results change our understanding of the relationship between political institutions 
and growth? An extensive literature studies how democracy and better political institutions can 
impact growth. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that underlying institutional problems are the main 
cause of poor economic performance. Their view is that bad political institutions lead to 
distortionary policies, which ultimately reduce growth and increase volatility. Our results are 
supportive of this view, but we place the focus on the interaction of institutions with crises, 
which are moments in time where key decisions are made.
8 In that sense, our results are also in 
line with those of Rodrik (1999), who maintains that domestic social conflicts (which are 
typically exacerbated during crises) are key to understanding poor growth performance in many 
countries.  
When dealing with crises, the new political economy literature has emphasized that they 
facilitate the adoption of superior policy reforms. Drazen (2002) provides a review of some 
mechanisms by which this process takes place: (1) the reshuffling of interest groups that might 
weaken anti-reform groups, (2) the perception of the need of change by policymakers, (3) a 
sufficiently large deterioration of the status quo, (4) the suspension of selfish interest.
9  Our main 
difference with this strand of the literature is that we do not assume that all reforms brought 
about by crises are necessarily good for growth (or equivalently that the “status quo” policies are 
necessarily bad). We show empirically that crises may facilitate policies that enhance long-run 
growth, as maintained by this literature, but only in countries with more democratic political 
institutions.    
Overall, the hypothesis that we test and the results that we obtain are consistent with 
Rodrik (2000), who argues that democracy yields better policy outcomes because it facilitates 
intertemporal cooperation between agents through deliberation, rules that that prevent excessive 
redistribution of income, and procedural rules that facilitate policy compromises. Therefore, 
although democratic political regimes might not produce the most immediate policy responses, 
the empirical evidence shows that on average they deliver better reforms during crises and 
increase long-run growth. 
                                          
8 We also use a different methodology to control for the endogeneity of political institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
use colonial origins as instruments, while we use internal instruments in a System GMM setting.  
9 Lora and Olivera (2004) provide some empirical evidence that is consistent with this “crisis hypothesis” by 





Our view of the linkage between crises and long run growth is summarized schematically 
in Figure 1. Building on the aforementioned literature on the political economy of crises, our 
starting point is that crises are episodes when there is a re-shuffling of interest groups and 
important decisions can be made. It is possible, as the literature tends to assume, that interest 
groups that were blocking optimal reforms will be weakened. But the crisis can also provide 
incentives for interest groups in favor of wrong policies and reforms (those that may alleviate 
their short-run losses at the expense of long-run growth) to increase their influence on the 
government. The amount of pressure they will exert will depend directly with how much they 
stand to lose from the crisis or win from its resolution. The outcome will depend on the political 
institutions present at the time of the crisis, and more specifically, on the ability of the 






Figure 1.  Organizing Framework 
 
   
 
As an example, consider a banking crisis. Debtors and creditors will tend to have 
opposing interests and views on how the losses from the crisis should be distributed. Suppose, 
for the sake of the argument, that one group (i.e., debtors to banks) is smaller but more 
economically concentrated and powerful, while the other group (creditors) is larger in terms of 
constituency but less structured. To solve the crisis, the government has to choose between two 
distinct set of policies. Policy A reduces the burden on debtors at the expense of greater costs for 
long-term growth—for example, because it destroys creditors’ confidence in the functioning of 
the financial system and its ability to protect the value of savings, and thus results in lower future 
financial intermediation and growth. Instead, Policy B redistributes the losses more equitably and 
is a better policy in terms of its long-run effects because it does not undermine confidence in the 
operation of the financial system. Debtors, who care more about minimizing short-term losses, 
will prefer and lobby for policy A.
10 A democracy, where the size of the constituency that 
supports either policy is important, may be better able to contain these pressures and select 
superior policies. On the other hand, an autocratic government may provide a quicker policy 
reaction that minimizes the duration and negative effects of the crisis. We test these two 
possibilities in the next section.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Our approach follows the growth methodologies used by Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and 
Aghion et al. (2006), among others. We examine the direct effect of crises on growth and look at 
their interaction with several political variables.  
We use a panel of 78 countries with data for the years 1970-2004.  The dependent 
variables are GDP per capita and GDP per worker.  As is now standard in the literature, we 
transform all variables in our database into five-year averages to eliminate business cycle 
fluctuations and focus on long-term growth. Thus, the subscript t designates one of those five-
year averages. 
We apply the System GMM estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator allows us to address the joint 
                                          
10 This would be the case, for example, if they have a sufficiently high discount rate or cannot fully appropriate the 
higher returns of the growth-enhancing policy.  
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endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and explicitly controls for 
potential biases arising from country specific effects. All our regressions include the small 
sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) in order to obtain robust two-step standard 
errors.  
Specifically, we want to estimate the following equation: 
 
,, 1 , 1 1 ,2 , , 3 , , , (1 ) ' it it it it it it it it t i it y y y Crisis Crisis Pol Pol Z α ββ β γ μ η ε −− −= − + + ∗ + + + + +     (1) 
 
where  , it y is the logarithm of output per capita or worker;  , it Crisis is a measure of crisis (to be 
defined below),  , it Pol is a qualitative measure of political institutions,  , it Z is a set of control 
variables which are common in the growth literature,  t μ is a time-specific effect;  i η is a country-
specific time-invariant effect; and , it ε is the idiosyncratic error term.  
Our hypothesis is that  1 0 β <  and  2 0 β >  so that the direct impact of crises is negative on 
growth, but the overall effect becomes less negative—and potentially positive—with higher 
quality of political institutions.  
Note that equation (1) is equivalent to  
 
,, 1 1 , 2,, 3 , , , ' it it it it it it it t i it y y Crisis Crisis Pol Pol Z α ββ β γ μ η ε − =+ + ∗ + + + + +      (2) 
 
This is the equation we estimate. It is a dynamic panel specification with endogenous 
independent variables. Several sources of endogeneity need to be accounted for, in particular 
omitted variables and simultaneity biases.  A key complication is the possible correlation 
between the independent variables and the unobserved country-specific effect   i η .  
The System GMM approach uses a first-difference transformation of (2) to eliminate the 
unobserved country-specific effect  i η , and internal lagged-level instruments to replace the 
endogenous variables in the transformed difference equation. These lagged instruments are valid 
under the assumption that the independent variables are weakly exogenous.  This means that they 
may be correlated with present and past error terms but not with future errors.
11 This is a 
reasonable assumption for the crisis and political measures because it means they are 
                                          
11 So that using a lagged variable as instrument is valid because past variables are not correlated to present error 
terms.   
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uncorrelated with unanticipated shocks, even though expected future dynamics may affect them. 
The problem with this approach is that lagged variables are weak instruments in the presence of 
serial correlation.
12 This is particularly problematic in the case of political variables, which 
typically show a great deal of persistence. In order to address this problem, system GMM 
additionally estimates the level equation using lagged differences as instruments for the 
contemporaneous level explanatory variables.
13  The inclusion of two equations, one in 
differences and another one in levels, gives the “System” GMM estimator its name. A more 
detailed explanation on the System GMM approach is included in the Appendix.  
We use several measures for both  , it Crisis  and political institutions , it Pol . Next we provide some 
more detail on these key variables.  
 
3.1 Crisis Variables 
 
Broadly speaking, the crisis literature distinguishes between crises with external origin and crises 
with domestic origin. Within each of these categories, there is a wide array of definitions. A 
popular kind of external crisis is based on the concept of “current account reversal” (Milesi-
Ferreti and Razin, 1998 and 2000; Edwards, 2004a and 2004b), which is typically defined as a 
reduction in the current account deficit of a certain percentage of GDP in one year. A somewhat 
related concept is the definition of “sudden stops” in capital flows, popularized by Calvo (1998), 
which is typically defined as an unexpected reduction in net capital inflows. 
14 Sudden stops or 
current account reversals could trigger a currency crisis.
15  
                                          
12 A very persistent variable would mean that lags are not correlated with the differenced variable we are trying to 
instrument. See the Appendix for further details.   
13 This last step rests on the assumption that even though crises and political institutions may be correlated to  i η , 
changes in these variables are not correlated to  i η  after controlling for all other included independent variables. 
Note that since  i η  is time-invariant, this assumption means that an unobserved country characteristic which does 
not change over time is assumed uncorrelated with the change in crises, political institutions and other variables that 
occurs over time.  
14 Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004) distinguish between sudden stops that lead to current account reversals 
and those that do not. When sudden stops are not accompanied by current account reversals, then presumably the 
country found an alternative source of financing, namely reserve depletion or exceptional funding from an 
international financial institution. Reserve depletion is feasible only when the Central Bank has sufficient 
international reserves to spend and is willing to use them. If the sudden stop is persistent (i.e., if capital inflows are 
not restored promptly), then the strategy of reserve depletion could lead to a currency crisis. 
15 See Frankel and Rose (1996), Frankel and Wei (2004), and Frankel (2005) for a discussion on currency crises and 
the links with other varieties of crises.  
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Examples of crises with domestic origin include hyperinflations or balance of payment 
crises triggered by domestic fiscal imbalances (i.e., Krugman 1979). Other forms of crises, such 
as “debt crises” are harder to characterize based on their origin, as there might be debt crises 
triggered by external shocks (i.e., sudden stops), or debt crises triggered by fiscal policy 
mismanagement. Empirically, one useful definition of “debt crisis” is provided by Manasse, 
Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini (2003). A country is defined to be in a “debt crisis if it is 
classified as being in default by Standard and Poor’s, or if it receives a large non-concessional 
IMF loan defined as access in excess of 100 percent quota.”   
While most of these concepts are closely related, these varieties do not always overlap.
16 
We want to use a crisis variable that is more closely correlated with many possible varieties 
discussed above. In particular, we do not want to limit the analysis to crises of domestic origin 
because, even when the origin of a crisis is outside the direct control of domestic authorities, 
there are policies that a country can follow to reduce its vulnerability to, and the incidence of, 
those events.
17 As a first approximation, we could build a consensus crisis indicator,
18 but the 
different time frames available for the various crisis definitions would severely limit the sample. 
Thus, we follow a different approach. We use banking crisis, a variable that is more closely 
associated with all the other forms of crises, and show robustness with other crisis indicators.
19 
Due to the risky nature of its activity, the banking sector is highly vulnerable to a multiplicity of 
shocks. Thus, banking crises typically encompass a wide variety of events, some with external 
origin and some with domestic origin.  
Our main crisis variable is calculated using the “banking crisis” dummy of Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003).
20 Additionally, as robustness checks, we construct similar crisis measures 
using a systemic banking crisis dummy from the same source, several sudden stop variables and 
                                          
16 More likely than not, a sudden stop, particularly a large and persistent one, will eventually lead to a current 
account reversal if there are no alternative sources of financing. Whether it also entails a currency crisis depends on 
whether reserves become depleted, and on the exchange rate regime in place before the shock. Milesi-Ferreti and 
Razin (1998, 2000) study the relation between currency crises and current account reversals. They conclude that 
they are only tenuously related. Similarly, Cavallo and Frankel (2007) find only weak correlation between sudden 
stops and currency crises in their sample.  
17 For example, de-dollarization in Calvo et al. 2004, or openness to trade in Cavallo and Frankel 2007). 
18 See for example(Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann 2005)) 
19 We find that, in our sample, banking crisis is more than twice more correlated with the rest of the crisis 
definitions, than any of the other variables. Thus, while the average correlation of banking crisis with the rest of the 
definitions is 0.25, the average correlation between sudden stops and the other crisis variables is 0.12, and for debt 
crisis the correlation is only 0.10.    
20 See the Appendix for more details on this variable.  
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current account reversals from Cavallo and Frankel (2007), and a debt crisis indicator from 
Manasse, Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini (2003).  
All our crisis variables are computed as the ratio of crisis years to total available years in 
the period and range from 0 to 1. For example, if the country had a crisis that lasted two years, 
then our crisis measure is 0.4 for the five-year period. We choose to construct it this way in order 
to incorporate the duration aspect of crises, which can impact the crisis outcome considerably.
21  
 
3.3 Political Variables 
 
For the political variable , it Pol , we use measures of democracy and institutional quality that are 
common in the political economy literature. Our main variable is the aggregate indicator of 
democracy from the Polity IV database (polity2). This index ranges from -10 to 10 (where -10 is 
high autocracy and 10 is high democracy) and is constructed as the difference between the sub-
indexes for democracy (democ2) and autocracy (autoc2). It provides a qualitative measure of 
democratic institutions, defined by the existence of a high level of political participation, civil 
liberties and institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
22 We also use 
pure measures of external constraints on the government (exconst2) and political competition 
(polcomp2) from the same database. Additionally, we perform robustness checks using 
indicators from the Freedom House database of civil liberties and political rights, and the Polcon 
database from Henisz (2000). 
 
3.4 Other Control Variables 
 
As control variables  , it Z  we follow the standard growth literature and include the following: 
openness to trade (measured as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP), government 
spending (government expenditure over GDP), education (years of secondary schooling for the 
population above 15 years of age) and inflation. It is worth emphasizing that all these regressors 
are treated as endogenous variables. Finally, all our regressions include time fixed effects to 
control for period-specific events that may affect several countries at the same time.
23  
                                          
21 It also allows us to avoid having a binary indicator which could invalidate the use of lags as instruments. 
However, our results are robust to the use of other variations of crisis indicators used in the literature.   
22 See the Appendix for more details.  
23 Also, the methodology employed assumes no correlation across countries in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time 






4. Estimation Results: How Political Variables Condition the Growth 
Outcome of Crises  
 
Table 1 shows the impact of crises on long term growth, both directly and via the interaction 
with political variables.  The first two regressions estimate the effects on output per capita 
growth, while the next two repeat the analysis for output per worker (labor productivity). Among 
each set, the first regression estimates the independent effects of crises and political institutions, 






Table 1. Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Political Institutions 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per capita   Log GDP per worker  
      
  (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
      
      
Crisis   -0.131***  -0.179***  -0.136***  -0.165*** 
[Systemic  BC]  [0.032] [0.036] [0.030] [0.037] 
      
Crisis * Polity2    0.013**    0.009** 
   [0.005]   [0.004] 
      
Polity2  0.004 -0.000  0.001 -0.002 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
                                          
24 Table 1 also presents the Hansen over-identification test, where the null hypothesis is that the instrumental 
variables (internal instruments) are uncorrelated with the residuals (also known as the exclusion restrictions), and the 
2
nd order serial correlation test, where the null hypothesis is that the errors in the differenced equation exhibit no 
second order correlation (more on these tests below).  
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     Table 1., continued       
 
Control  Variables     
      
Initial GDP per capita   0.984***a  0.986***     
[log] [0.023]  [0.020]     
      
Initial GDP per worker       0.955***  0.954*** 
[log]     [0.035]  [0.032] 
      
Trade openness   0.106*  0.076  0.058  0.034 
[X+M/GDP,  log]  [0.060] [0.057] [0.059] [0.048] 
      
Government Spending  -0.154**  -0.145**  -0.075  -0.071 
[Government 
consumption/GDP, log] 
[0.064] [0.070] [0.063] [0.053] 
      
Inflation -0.054**  -0.050**  -0.061***  -0.061*** 
[log  [1+inflation]]  [0.025] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] 
      
Education  0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
[Secondary Enrollment, log]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
      
Constant  0.240 0.363 0.587 0.704** 
  [0.357] [0.344] [0.372] [0.315] 
      
Hansen  p-value  0.23 0.47 0.19 0.51 
AR1  test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2  test  0.08 0.26 0.19 0.26 
      
Observations  419 419 424 424 
Number  of  Countries  78 78 77 77 
Number of instruments  75  83  75  83 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown]. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a: Note that we are estimating equation (2) in the text, so that the effect on GDP growth for this particular 




Regression (1.1) shows that crises generally have a negative impact on long-term growth. 
This is a robust result across all our specifications and is consistent with most results in the 
financial crises literature.
25 The coefficients are economically significant: for example, a country 
that has two year of banking crises in a five-year period (i.e., crisis=0.4) grows 5.24 percent less 
between periods than a country that suffered no crises.
26 Whether this is a small or large effect is 
debatable, but the fit of the estimation is quite good. In particular, note that the regression 
satisfies the specification and serial correlation tests. More interesting perhaps, is that political 
institutions per se (in this case measured by the combined democracy index, polity2) do not 
appear to be significant for growth. This is consistent with results by Acemoglu et al. (2005), 
who show that the positive correlation between income and democracy disappears once they 
control for unobserved fixed effects.
27  
The problem with regression (1.1) is that the linear specification could be misleading. 
Political institutions variables have limited time variation. Thus, they might enter as insignificant 
in regressions like (1.1) because their effect is absorbed by the fixed effect.
28 This does not mean 
that they do not matter. One way around this identification problem is to find particular situations 
where the quality of the institutions might matter most. We believe that one such situation is 
during times of crisis. During these times, authorities choose policy responses that can either 
improve on the status quo and set the stage for recovery, or simply redistribute gains and losses 
without taking corrective actions.  
Our hypothesis is that authorities, like any other economic agent, respond to incentives 
and that their incentives structure is, in turn, determined by the nature of political institutions and 
by the availability of checks and balances.
29 In strong democracies policymakers are ultimately 
accountable to voters, while in less democratic regimes special interests have more power. 
Therefore, it is more likely that the correct policy choices during crises are going to be made in 
                                          
25 See Bordo and Meissner (2007). 
26 This number comes from multiplying the corresponding coefficient by 0.4. (i.e., -0.131*0.4=0.0524). 
27 They look at the causality from growth to democratization, while we are doing the opposite. However, their 
results point to the fact that unobserved fixed effects determine a common development path where both democracy 
and growth are intertwined. So once this path is controlled for, there is no positive correlation between democracy 
and growth.  What determines this path? They consider historical factors that may condition the quality of 
institutions, on top of which we believe that the interaction with crises plays a pivotal role.   
28 While we do not explicitly have fixed-effects in the regression, our estimation methodology deals with them by 
first-differencing. 
29 For a comprehensive study on how political institutions affect the policymaking process, and this, in turn, the 
quality of public policies, see Inter-American Development Bank (2005).  
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more open and democratic societies.  We try to capture these effects of political institutions 
during times of crisis through the use of interaction terms in our regressions.  
Regression (1.2) adds the interaction between crises and political institutions and shows 
that this is both economically and statistically significant. The positive coefficient of the 
interaction indicates that more democratic political institutions can mitigate the negative effect of 
crises on growth. Note that the coefficient of the crisis variable itself remains negative and 
significant, while the coefficient for polity2 is still insignificant. The magnitude of the 
coefficients shows the interaction effect is also economically significant. A very strong 
democracy like the United States, with a polity score of 10, can completely neutralize the 
negative effects of crises.
30 In contrast, in a country with particularly poor democratic institutions 
like Egypt, with an average polity score of -6 for recent years, the overall negative effect of a 
crisis is magnified by over 40 percent compared to a country with a neutral political score of 0, 
or 424 percent compared to a country like the US.
31  
This shows that political institutions play a key role during times of crisis.  The 
importance of our results is strengthened when looking at the case of China, a country that has 
not suffered major financial crises in recent decades—presumably due to its closed capital 
account and the underdevelopment of the financial system—but may well face such crises in the 
near future as it continues to grow and to loosen restrictions. China’s combined polity score 
currently averages -7, which according to our results, means that China could have a hard time 
learning from a financial crisis.  Therefore, it would make sense for China to be extremely 
careful to avoid reforms that can increase the incidence of crises without first improving 
democratic institutions. In other words, the sequence of reforms is key, with democratic 
institutions preceding financial deepening in order to improve the chances of success.
32   
The last two regressions in Table 1, in columns (1.3) and (1.4), show that our results are 
robust when we use productivity growth as the dependent variable. This provides evidence that 
the identified interaction between crises and political institutions must work through a 
                                          
30 For example, if the United States suffers one year of crisis during a five-year period (our crisis measure is equal to 
0.2), then the overall effect on growth is only -0.0098 or -0.98 percent [-0.179*0.2+(0.013*0.2*10],  
31 These numbers are computed as follows: -0.0514=-0.179*(0.2)+(0.013*(0.2)*(-6))  vs. only -0.0358 if it had a 
polity score of 0. If compared to the results of -0.0098 for a country like the United States, with a polity score of 10, 
then the effect of crises is magnified by a factor of 5.24 (an increase of 424 percent).  
32 Note that this debate is akin to an old debate in the economic literature on the right sequencing of structural 
reform. See, for example, Edwards (1990).   
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mechanism that enhances labor productivity.
33 For concreteness, throughout the rest of the paper 
we use GDP per capita growth as the dependent variable, but we show in the Appendix that all 
our results apply to productivity growth as well.  
In an attempt to further pin down the kind of political institutions that can help to mitigate 
the negative effects of crises, in Table 2 we decompose the Polity index into the sub-indexes for 
democracy (democ2), autocracy (autoc2), external constraints on the government (extconst2) and 
political competition (polcomp2).  All these regressions are variations of regression (1.2), with a 
different political sub-index.  
 
Table 2. GDP per Capita Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Democracy, 
Autocracy, External Constraints and Political Competition 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per capita  
      
  (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
      
Crisis -0.248***  -0.077*  -0.359***  -0.295*** 
[BC] [0.053]  [0.040]  [0.093]  [0.084] 
      
Crisis * Democracy  0.020**       
 [0.008]       
      
Democracy -0.000       
[democ2] [0.007]       
      
Crisis  *  Autocracy   -0.028**    
     [0.011]    
      
Autocracy   -0.001     
[autoc2]   [0.007]    
      
Crisis * External Constraints      0.044**   
     [0.017]   
      
External  Constraints     -0.004  
[exconst2]     [0.009]   
      
Crisis * Political Competition        0.023** 
      [0.010] 
      
Political  Competition      0.002 
[Polcomp2]      [0.008] 
                                          
33 We can safely reject mechanisms that affect only the labor participation rate (workers/population).
 For example, it 
can be argued that more democratic institutions facilitate emigration of previously unemployed people who lose all 
hope of finding a job after a crisis.   
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          Table 2., continued 
 
Control Variables      
Initial GDP per capita   0.984***  0.992***  0.985***  0.978*** 
[log] [0.027]  [0.022]  [0.018]  [0.024] 
      
Trade openness   0.077  0.087  0.086  0.063 
[X+M/GDP, log]  [0.058]  [0.059]  [0.063]  [0.056] 
      
Government  Spending  -0.145** -0.167** -0.155** -0.146** 
[Government consumption/GDP, log]  [0.068]  [0.067]  [0.071]  [0.068] 
      
Inflation  -0.039 -0.053***  -0.036* -0.049** 
[log [1+inflation]]  [0.025]  [0.017]  [0.021]  [0.020] 
      
Education 0.006**  0.005**  0.006***  0.006*** 
[Secondary Enrollment, log]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
      
Constant  0.316 0.352 0.290 0.451 
 [0.346]  [0.326]  [0.401]  [0.306] 
      
Observations  419 419 419 419 
Number  of  Countries  78 78 78 78 
Number  of  instruments  83 83 83 83 
      
Hansen  p-value  0.39 0.50 0.53 0.34 
AR1  test  p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2  test  p-value  0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 
        
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown]. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Regression (2.1) uses democracy (democ2) as the political variable and shows that, as 
expected, higher levels of democratic institutions mitigate the negative effects of crises. In the 
Polity IV database, democ2 is a qualitative sub-index constructed on the basis of three 
interdependent elements: i) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens 
can express effective preferences on alternative policies and leaders, ii) the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive and iii) the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens.  Other aspects of plural democracy, such  as  the  rule  of  law,  
systems  of  checks  and  balances,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  so  on,  are specific 
manifestations of these general principles.   
Similarly, regression (2.2) uses autocracy (autoc2) as the political variable and shows that 
having an autocratic government makes crises worse for growth. In the Polity IV database, the 
autoc2 sub-index is operationally defined as a government that sharply restricts or suppresses 
competitive political participation, with a chief executive that is chosen by a political elite and  
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exercises power with few institutional constraints. This regression is important because it shows 
that the two components of polity2, democracy and autocracy, work in opposite directions in 
terms of their interaction effect with crises.  
Furthermore, regression (2.2) provides evidence against the view that an authoritarian 
government, able to make rapid and strong decisions, is better able to deal with the chaotic 
environment of crises. Less autocratic countries that go into a crisis might well take longer to 
recuperate because of deliberative politics and the time-consuming policy-making process of 
democratic regimes, but the resulting policy responses are probably going to be better equipped 
to resolve the vulnerabilities that led to the crisis, instrument appropriate reforms, and avoid 
future crises (i.e., reduce growth volatility).
34  
Both democ2 and autoc2 are in turn constructed from other more specific indicators.  The 
first indicator, external constraints on governments (xconst2.), is a measure of the level of checks 
and balances in the political system. Operationally, it measures the extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or 
collectivities. Regression (2.3) shows that more checks-and-balances play a positive role, once 
again, via their interaction with crises, and supports our view that political institutions affect the 
decision process in times of crisis.  
Political competition (polcomp2) has a similar positive effect. This variable measures the 
extent to which alternative preferences for policy can be pursued in the political arena, and the 
extent to which there are binding rules on when, whether, and how, political preferences are 
expressed. Both one-party states and western democracies may score highly in this index—the 
former by channeling participation through only one party, with limited diversity of opinions, 
and the latter, by allowing relatively stable groups to compete nonviolently for political 
influence. A low value reflects unregulated participation, an environment where there are no 
enduring political organizations or controls on political activity. The results in regression (2.4) 
are consistent with the claim that unregulated participation increases the chances of expropriation 
during times of crises. In states with unregulated participation—i.e., with a low polcomp2 
score—those with more to lose in a crisis might find it profitable to devote more resources to 
                                          
34 The fact that democracy helps to lower growth volatility has already been documented in the literature. Mobarak 
(2005) studies the interrelationship between democracy, volatility and growth. He explores the determinants of 
average growth and its volatility in a two-equation system, finding that higher levels of democracy lower volatility, 
while volatility itself reduces growth.  
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lobby (i.e., bribe the government) and obtain policies that might help them but may hinder long 
term growth. This effect is limited if there is a stable competitive environment in which all 
voices are heard, like in modern western democracies. Furthermore, it will also be limited in the 
case of one-party states, where the party ideology may not always coincide with these short-term 
interests.  
 
4.1 Other Political Variables 
 
Table 3 shows that our main results are robust to the use of different sources for the political 
variables, such as the Polcon database obtained from Henisz (2000) and the Freedom House 
database “Freedom in the World” (2007).  
 
 
Table 3.  GDP per Capita Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Polcon and 
Freedom House indicators 
Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per capita  
  
  (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 











[BC]  [0.061] [0.062] [0.043] [0.033] [0.041] 
       
Crisis * PolconIII  0.411**         
 [0.159]         
       
PolconIII -0.004         
 [0.083]         
       
Crisis * PolconV    0.265**       
     [0.107]      
       
PolconV   0.028      
     [0.083]      
       
Crisis * FH       0.011*     
       [0.006]     
       
FH       0.002     
       [0.006]      
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  Table 3., continued 
      
Crisis * FH Political Rights        0.008*   
        [0.005]   
       
FH  Political  Rights      0.005   
        [0.004]   
       
Crisis * FH Civil Liberties          0.009 
         [0.006] 
       
FH Civil Liberties          -0.002 
       [0.005] 
Control Variables       
Initial GDP per capita   0.995***  0.982***  0.972***  0.961***  0.982*** 
[log]  [0.018] [0.024] [0.023] [0.025] [0.022] 
       
Trade openness   0.040  0.051  0.055  0.061  0.051 
[X+M/GDP,  log]  [0.036] [0.037] [0.055] [0.046] [0.059] 
       








[0.060] [0.068] [0.063] [0.079] [0.056] 
       
Inflation -0.065**  -0.042  -0.042  -0.050*  -0.049** 
[log [1+inflation]]  [0.025]  [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.023] 
       
Education  0.005*** 0.005** 0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
[Secondary Enrollment, log]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
       
Constant 0.669***  0.560**  0.539  0.583*  0.509 
  [0.245] [0.267] [0.344] [0.304] [0.362] 
       
Observations  413 413 419 419 419 
Number  of  Countries  77 77 78 78 78 
Number of instruments  83  83  83  83  83 
       
Hansen  p-value  0.75 0.54 0.35 0.39 0.37 
AR1 test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
AR2 test p-value  0.00  0.01  0.24  0.20  0.20 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 




Henisz (2000) provides an alternate measure of political institutions. The Political 
Constraint Index (POLCON) measures the possibility of a change in policy given the structure of 
a country’s political institutions (number of veto points) and the preferences of the political 
actors in these institutions (partisan alignment and homogeneity of  preferences within each 
branch). The scale ranges from 0 to 1. There are two versions, PolconIII and PolconV, which are 
constructed in a similar way, but PolconV includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and 
sub-federal entities. Regressions (3.1) and (3.2) show that these alternative measures of political 
constraints are also important explanatory variables. A low Polcon score means that there are 
fewer constraints on sudden changes in policies, and therefore more chances that governments 
could arbitrarily benefit special interest groups, an idea consistent with our previous results.  
In regressions (3.3) to (3.5) we use the Freedom in the World database, compiled 
annually by Freedom House based on an assessment of political rights and civil liberties. The 
original indexes have a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the freest country and 7 the least free.  In 
order to make it comparable to the Polity IV series, we reverse the scale and standardize the 
combined index to a scale that varies from -10 to 10, where 10 is the freest rating. We do the 
same with the sub-indexes of political rights and civil liberties.
35  
Regression (3.3) shows that having a higher rating of “freedom” during crises is good for 
growth. This is consistent with our previous results.  More interesting perhaps, is the 
decomposition between political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are defined in this index 
as “the right to elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate”, while civil liberties emphasize “the freedoms of expression and 
belief”. Regression (3.4) shows that political rights are driving the main results. The right to elect 
people who will impact policies and the accountability of the government play a key role during 
times of crises. By contrast regression (3.5) shows that whether people can freely express their 
opinions or not, as measured by civil liberties and regardless of their impact on actual decisions, 
is not equally important.  
                                          
35 Data are available from 1972, so we compute the first five-year average using only three years.  
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4.2 Other Crisis Dummies  
Table 4 shows that results are also robust to the use of different crisis proxies.  
 
Table 4. GDP per Capita Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Polity2 
Robustness: Additional Crisis Indicators 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per Capita 
  
  (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) 
       
SBC Crisis  -
0.176*** 
    
    [0.045]      
SBC Crisis * Polity2  0.015**         
  [0.006]      
       
SS1   -0.378      
   [0.258]       
       
SS1 * Polity2    0.083**       
     [0.041]       
       
SS4     -0.143    
     [0.238]     
       
SS4 * Polity2      0.050     
     [0.034]     
       
SS5       -0.498  
         [0.333]   
       
SS5 * Polity2        0.095*   
         [0.051]   
       
Debt  Crisis       -0.237** 
       [0.116] 
       
Debt Crisis * Polity2          0.013* 
       [0.008] 
       
       
Polity2  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002  -0.008* 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]  
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Table 4., continued 
       
Control Variables       
       
Initial GDP per capita   0.989***  1.005***  1.008***  0.987***  0.973*** 
[log]  [0.019] [0.026] [0.022] [0.025] [0.056] 
Trade openness   0.060  0.101*  0.093*  0.072  -0.004 
[X+M/GDP, log]  [0.045]  [0.053] [0.053] [0.048] [0.103] 









[0.059] [0.068] [0.072] [0.053] [0.162] 





[log [1+inflation]]  [0.023]  [0.024] [0.023] [0.017] [0.085] 
Education 0.006***  0.005***  0.006***  0.005**  0.005 
[Secondary Enrollment, log]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Constant  0.438 0.238 0.252 0.401 0.836 
  [0.270] [0.378] [0.350] [0.299] [0.734] 
       
Observations  419 401 401 396 183 
Number  of  Countries  78 78 78 78 33 
Number of Instruments  83  82  82  82  85 
Hansen  p-value  0.54 0.59 0.49 0.52 1.00 
AR1 test p-value  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.19 
AR2 test p-value  0.05  0.87  0.30  0.10  0.95 
 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown]. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
In regression (4.1), we replace the banking crisis variable from Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) with the systemic banking crisis variable. The difference is that while the former includes 
borderline and smaller banking crisis, the latter only includes episodes when much or all of bank 
capital has been exhausted. Thus, systemic banking crisis is a much more restrictive definition of 
crisis. Despite the change in the definition, the results reported in (4.1) remain unchanged.  
In regressions (4.2)-(4.4), we change the crisis variable to sudden stops, a form of crisis 
with external origin. Cavallo and Frankel (2007) define different variants of sudden stops that, in 
turn, they adapt from earlier work by Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004). The preferred 
definition is SS1. This algorithm classifies as a sudden stop a situation where in year t, the 
financial account surplus of country i (prevailing at year t-1) has fallen at least two standard 
deviations below the sample mean for that country; the current account deficit falls by any  
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amount either in t or in t+1; and GDP per capita falls by any amount either in t or in t+1. SS5 is 
equivalent to SS1 but uses the criterion that the sudden stop be accompanied by a loss of reserves 
rather than a fall in output. SS4 is, instead, equivalent to SS1 but is less restrictive in that it 
classifies as sudden stops events that do not necessarily trigger recessions or a fall in reserves 
(these events are akin to the “current account reversals” in the array of crises definitions).  
The results reported in (4.2)-(4.4) are broadly consistent with the previous results. In 
particular, the interaction between crisis and political institutions is always positive and 
statistically significant in two of the cases. Interestingly, it is not significant only in the case of 
SS4. This is reasonable since this is the one variant that, by not conditioning by fall in output or 
in international reserves, is more likely to identify events that are not really crises.
36 Also, note 
that the main difference with the previous results is that while the crisis dummy itself remains 
negative, it is rarely statistically significant in the regressions. This is probably due to the fact 
that sudden stops are, by definition, very rare events in the sample.
37 Despite this, the fact that the 
interaction between crisis and political institutions is usually statistically significant with the 
correct sign is reassuring evidence in favor of the main hypothesis.  
Finally, in regression (4.5) we change the crisis variable to the debt crisis indicator of 
Manasse, Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini (2003). Once again, we find that debt crises have a 
negative effect on long-term growth, but that effect is mitigated when crisis occur in countries 
with more democratic institutions.       
 
5. Endogeneity  
 
Although our dynamic panel system GMM methodology is suited to control for the potential 
endogeneity of all independent variables, the validity of this estimation method depends on the 
assumption of weak exogeneity of the regressors. This means that they are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with future realization of the error term. To test this assumption we use the Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions and find in all regressions that the joint validity of our 
instruments cannot be rejected (p-values reported in all tables).  There still remains the problem 
that a sub-set of instruments might be not valid. In particular, for the crisis indicators and 
                                          
36 For example, a positive terms of trade shock might render a fall in net capital inflows and a current account 
reversal, but it is clearly not a crisis event. 
37 The total number of SS1 episodes captured using the methodology of Cavallo and Frankel (2007) is 86, which is 
2.4 percent of total available country/year observations in the dataset  
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interactions, it may be the case that lags (from t-2 back) are weak instruments.  We therefore 
perform a difference-in-Hansen test for this subset (crisis and interactions) and find that it also 
cannot be rejected.
38 Moreover, a necessary condition of the System GMM estimator is that the 
difference error term is not serially correlated, something which we also confirm in all our 
regressions by rejecting the Arellano-Bond AR2 test (p-values reported in all tables).   
Beyond our econometric methodology, the fact that we are focusing on the interaction 
between political variables and crises reduces the potential concerns about endogeneity.  For 
example, if the source of endogeneity is the simultaneity of growth and the interaction of 
political institutions and crisis, causality could be questioned here by asking whether it is better 
political institutions when a crisis hits that leads to higher growth—as we maintain—or that 
higher growth improves political institutions only when there is a crisis? It is much harder to 
argue for this second explanation.
39  
Similarly, the potential omitted variables bias is typically lower in interactions than in 
levels. For example, if there is a variable we have omitted that is correlated with a crisis dummy 
and leads to growth effects not accounted by the other explanatory variables (in particular, not a 
country or time-specific effect), then we may have an endogeneity bias in the level crisis 
coefficient. However, the bias will only arise in the coefficient of the interaction term if the 
correlation between the omitted variable and a crisis changes with the quality of political 




The main message of this paper is that countries are more likely to take advantage of crises if 
their governments have the constraints to select the policies that are beneficial to society as a 
whole, and not just a particular subset of interest groups.  
Our results provide evidence that democratic political institutions help to ameliorate the 
negative impact of economic crises on long-term growth. We conjecture that this result arises 
because democracies tend to deliver better policy responses in the aftermath of shocks. This 
means that, while there might be examples of benevolent dictators that react quickly and pursue 
                                          
38 The details are available from the authors upon request.  
39  Note that we say only because there is no direct relationship in our results between growth and institutions. If 
there were a positive correlation, then the question would be whether higher growth makes political institutions 
better especially when there is a crisis.  
40 See Aghion et al (2006) for a discussion of this issue.  
 
29
good economic policies, on average, autocratic regimes are unable to handle crises well and 
deliver long-term growth. In other words, decisiveness—an attribute oftentimes assigned to 
autocratic regimes—does not imply that sound policies are implemented.   
This paper has several important policy implications. First, if a country’s democratic 
institutions are strong, it may welcome crises as opportunities to learn and improve the policy 
stance. On the other hand, if institutions are weak, crises may not be useful to promote growth-
enhancing reforms. More likely than not, special interests might co-opt policy responses and 
crises will only end up hurting the public at the expense of more powerful interest groups. We 
view this as an important take-away for the proponents of the moral-hazard view, who argue that 
countries should “suffer” crises to learn from their mistakes.  
Furthermore, our results suggest that political reforms are important prerequisites of any 
economic reform that increases the likelihood of crises. For that reason, countries like China 
should be very cautious with the pace of economic liberalizations, at least until more democratic 
institutions are introduced.  
A next step in our analysis would be to further identify precise mechanisms through with 
political institutions help during times of crises. Our belief is that they aid in the selection and 
implementation of better policies, those that are growth-enhancing in the long run. This will be 
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Table A1.  GDP per Worker Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Democracy, 
Autocracy, External Constraints and Political Competition 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per worker  
  (A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3)  (A.4) 







[Systemic  BC]  [0.044] [0.045] [0.076] [0.065] 
      
Crisis * Democracy  0.015**       
  [0.006]     
      
Democracy  -0.001     
[democ2]  [0.005]     
      
Crisis * Autocracy    -0.024**     
     [0.009]    
      
Autocracy   0.007    
[autoc2]   [0.006]    
      
Crisis * External Constraints      0.031**   
     [0.014]  
      
External Constraints      -0.005   
[exconst2]     [0.009]  
      
Crisis * Political Competition        0.018** 
      [0.009] 
      
Political  Competition      -0.005 
[Polcomp2]      [0.006] 
      
Control  Variables      
      
Initial GDP per worker   0.951***  0.956***  0.955***  0.965*** 
[log]  [0.034] [0.029] [0.033] [0.037] 
      
Trade  openness    0.040 0.032 0.056 0.031 
[X+M/GDP,  log]  [0.050] [0.049] [0.050] [0.057] 
      
Government Spending  -0.047  -0.096*  -0.089*  -0.086  
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                           Table A1., continued 
      
[Government consumption/GDP, 
log] 
[0.061] [0.056] [0.052] [0.068] 









[log  [1+inflation]]  [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.018] 
      
Education  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***  0.005** 
[Secondary  Enrollment,  log]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
      
Constant  0.650* 0.724**  0.620** 0.697* 
  [0.341] [0.319] [0.293] [0.384] 
      
Observations  424 424 424 424 
Number  of  countries  77 77 77 77 
Number  of  instruments  83 83 83 83 
      
Hansen  p-value  0.69 0.47 0.47 0.47 
AR1  test  p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2  test  p-value  0.22 0.31 0.22 0.22 
 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown].  
Standard errors in brackets.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table A2. GDP per Worker Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Polcon and 
Freedom House Indicators 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per worker  
  
  (A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) (A3.4) (A3.5) 











[BC]  [0.052] [0.053] [0.034] [0.033] [0.035] 
       
Crisis * PolconIII  0.317*         
 [0.162]         
       
PolconIII 0.005         
 [0.100]         
       
Crisis * PolconV    0.258***       
     [0.095]      
       
PolconV   -0.012       
     [0.062]      
       
Crisis * FH Standarized      0.007     
       [0.006]     
       
FH Standarized      -0.000     
       [0.004]     
       
Crisis * FH Political Rights        0.005   
        [0.004]   
       
FH  Political  Rights      0.002   
        [0.003]   
       
Crisis * FH Civil Liberties          0.005 
         [0.006] 
       
FH Civil Liberties          -0.003 
       [0.004]  
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  Table A2, continued 
 
Control Variables       
       
Initial GDP per worker   0.950***  0.933***  0.959***  0.939***  0.961*** 
[log]  [0.041] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.029] 
       
Trade openness   0.038  0.037  0.031  0.040  0.024 
[X+M/GDP,  log]  [0.040] [0.038] [0.043] [0.041] [0.043] 
       
Government  Spending  -0.100 -0.074 -0.087 -0.064 -0.073 
[Government consumption/GDP, 
log] 
[0.077] [0.053] [0.056] [0.057] [0.057] 









[log [1+inflation]]  [0.020]  [0.020] [0.025] [0.018] [0.023] 
       
Education  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
[Secondary Enrollment, log]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
       
Constant  0.876** 0.858*** 0.747**  0.785**  0.712** 
  [0.342] [0.299] [0.310] [0.335] [0.296] 
       
Observations  418 418 424 424 424 
Number  of  Countries  76 76 77 77 77 
Number of instruments  83  83  83  83  83 
       
Hansen  p-value  0.47 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.48 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2 test p-value  0.14  0.24  0.18  0.21  0.23 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown]. 
Standard errors in brackets.  




Table A3.  GDP per Worker Growth Effects of Crises and Interaction with Polity2 
Robustness: Additional Crisis Indicators 
(Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Log GDP per worker 
       
  (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) 
       
SBC Crisis  -
0.155*** 
    
    [0.034]      
       
SBC Crisis * Polity2  0.012***         
  [0.005]      
       
SS1   -0.149       
   [0.180]       
       
SS1 * Polity2    0.055**       
     [0.027]       
       
SS4     -0.204     
     [0.335]    
       
SS4 * Polity2      0.063**     
     [0.030]    
       
       
SS5       -0.538  
         [0.374]   
       
SS5 * Polity2        0.091   
         [0.056]   
       
Debt  Crisis       -0.188** 
       [0.082] 
       
Debt Crisis * Polity2          0.008 
       [0.007] 
       
Polity2  -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
  [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]  
 
40
Table A3., continued 
 
Control Variables       
       
Initial GDP per capita   0.984***  0.964***  0.964***  0.936***  0.950*** 
[log]  [0.037] [0.038] [0.049] [0.037] [0.068] 
       
Trade openness   0.040  0.033  0.041  0.013  -0.004 
[X+M/GDP,  log]  [0.050] [0.053] [0.052] [0.054] [0.088] 
       
Government  Spending  -0.103*  -0.124*  -0.107 -0.037 -0.134 
[Government 
consumption/GDP, log] 
[0.061] [0.068] [0.085] [0.065] [0.149] 










[log [1+inflation]]  [0.016]  [0.023] [0.020] [0.017] [0.055] 
       
Education  0.004*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.004**  0.004 
[Secondary Enrollment, 
log] 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
       
Constant 0.499  0.832*  0.741  1.023**  1.004 
  [0.385] [0.445] [0.460] [0.391] [0.620] 
       
Observations  424 406 406 401 184 
Number  of  Countries  77 77 77 77 33 
Number of Instruments  83  82  82  82  85 
Hansen  p-value  0.56 0.36 0.43 0.49 1.00 
AR1 test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.19 
AR2 test p-value  0.10  0.24  0.20  0.57  0.95 
 
Time dummies are included in all regressions [coefficients not shown].  
Standard errors in brackets.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Congo, Rep.  634
Costa Rica  238
Denmark 128
Ecuador 248
Egypt, Arab Rep.  469
El Salvador  253
Finland 172
France 132







































Sierra Leone  724
Singapore 576
South Africa  199
Spain 184










United Kingdom  112
United States  111
Uruguay 298










Banking crisis: From Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). They present information on 117 systemic 
banking crises (defined as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) that have occurred in 93 
countries since the late 1970s. The paper also provides information on 51 borderline and smaller 
(non-systemic) banking crises in 45 countries during that period. Some judgment has gone into 
the compilation of this list, not only for countries lacking data on the size of the losses but also 
for countries where official estimates understate the problem. For instance, at some point in the 
1990s nearly every transition economy experienced a banking crisis, but not all of these were 
excluded to limit the number of countries with missing information. 
Debt crisis: From Manasse, Schimmelpfennig and Roubini (2003). A country is defined 
to be in a “debt crisis if it is classified as being in default by Standard & Poor’s or if it receives a 
large nonconcessional IMF loan defined as access in excess of 100 percent quota.” They have 
data for 47 countries, from 1970 to 2002. Thirty-three countries overlap with our sample: 
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Rep., Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
For other crisis variables definitions used, see referenced papers. 
 
Political Variables  
 
PolityIV. The PolityIV database contains qualitative measures of political institutions, 
constructed in the following way: 
 
•  Polity2 = democ2-autoc2 
 
•  democ2: Institutionalized Democracy. 
 
Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements:   
 
1.  Presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences on alternative policies and leaders.   
2.  Existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.   
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3.  Guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation.  
 
Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and  balances, 
freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general 
principles. 
Autoc2 (Institutionalized Autocracy). This variable is operationally defined in terms of 
the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics: 
 
1.  Sharp restriction or suppression of competitive political  participation  
2.  Selection of chief executives in a regularized process within the political elite  
3.  Once in office, the executive exercises power with few institutional constraints. 
 
Exconst2 (Executive Constraints).  This variable measures the checks and balances 
between the various parts of the decision-making process. Operationally, it refers to the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, either 
individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any “accountability group.” In 
Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the 
ruling party in a one-party state, councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, the 
military in coup-prone polities, and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.  
Polcomp2 (Political Competition). This variable is a combined index of the following 
features: 
 
•  The competitiveness of participation. The extent to which alternative 
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena 
•  Regulation of participation. Participation is regulated to the extent that there 
are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are 
expressed.  One-party states and Western democracies both regulate 
participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling 
participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of 
opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to 
compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated  
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participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations 
and no effective regime controls on political activity.  
 
Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Database. The following is an extract from the 
description in Freedom House’s website
41 “The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual 
evaluation of the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. The survey measures 
freedom—the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the 
government and other centers of potential domination—according to two broad categories: 
political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, 
compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who 
have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties 
allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.” 
Polcon. Extract from “Measures of Political Risk” by Henisz and Zelner (2005). “Henisz 
(2000) provides an alternate measure of political institutions. The Political Constraint Index 
political constraint index (POLCON) directly measures the feasibility of a change in policy given 
the structure of a nation’s political institutions (the number of veto points) and the preferences of 
the actors that inhabit them (the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity 
or homogeneity of the preferences within each branch” Both PolconIII and PolconV are 
constructed in a similar way, but PolconV includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and 
sub-federal entities.  
 
Other Control Variables Used in Regressions 
 
, it Z is a set of control variables which are common in the literature: 
•  Educational attainment = years of secondary schooling for population above 15 years of 
age.  
•  Government consumption / GDP: the assumption is that it measures expenditures not 
affecting productivity directly, but may create distortions of private decisions. These 
                                          
41 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007  
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distortions may arise from government measures themselves or from the public finance 
associated with them.  
•  Openness: This variable reflects the effect of policies on international trade, such as 
tariffs and trade restrictions.  
 
The use of these policy variables does not invalidate our intention to capture how 
political institutions may affect growth during periods of crisis, quite possibly through 
subsequent government policies. Our results show that if the effect of institutions during crises 









Variable Description, Sources and Summary Statistics
Variable Name Description  Souc Obs  Mean St Dev Min Max
gdppccteus  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) WDI (2007) 528.00 5411.15 7782.89 44.64 41356.83
rgdpwok  Real output per worker PWT 6.2  538.00 16865.10 17370.59 486.74 196172.60
Control Variables 
opetrade_r  Openness to trade, X+M/GDP WDI (2007) 502.00 0.61 0.34 0.08 2.29
infcpia_r  Inflation, consumer prices WDI (2007) 482.00 0.86 7.38 -0.02 117.50
ggfcepgdp_r  General government final consumption expenditure/GDP WDI (2007) 501.00 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.43
sec_bl  Secondary attainment as % of population above 15 Barro-Lee Extended CDI website541.00 24.46 15.99 0.10 72.30
Political Variables 
polity2  Combined indicator: democ2-autoc2 Polity4 538.00 1.75 7.37 -10.00 10.00
democ2  Institutionalized Democracy Polity4 527.00 4.78 4.21 0.00 10.00
autoc2  Institutionalized Autocracy Polity4 527.00 2.98 3.39 0.00 10.00
exconst2  Executive Constraints Concept Polity4 527.00 4.39 2.33 1.00 7.00
polcomp2  Political Competition Concept Polity4 527.00 5.80 3.73 1.00 10.00
polconiii  Polcon III  Henisz (2000) 529.00 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.68
poconv  Polcon V  Henisz (2000) 528.00 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.87
fh  Freedom House Standarized Freedom House 465.00 2.49 5.25 -7.14 9.99
fh_pr  Freedom House Political Rights Freedom House 465.00 1.43 6.93 -10.00 10.00
fh_cl  Freedom House Civil Liberties Freedom House 465.00 1.07 5.64 -10.00 10.00
Crisis Variables 
SS1  Sudden Stop  386.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
SS4  SS1 without gdp drop 386.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
SS5  SS1 with fall in reserves 381.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
bc  Banking crises  Caprio and  Klingebiel (1999)  381.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
sbc Systemic banking crises Caprio and  Klingebiel (1999)  382.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00




   
Econometric Methodology: System GMM  
 
We want to estimate an equation of the form: 
yi,t − yi,t−1   − 1yi,t−1  
′
xi,t  i  i,t  
This can be transformed to  
t i i t i t i t i x y y , , 1 , , ε η β α + + + =
′
−  (1) 
Simple OLS provides biased coefficients because  i η  (unobserved) is included in the error term. 
In particular, we need to allow for the fact that  
•  1 , − t i y  and  t i x ,  may be correlated to  i η   
•  1 , − t i y  and  t i x ,  are not strictly exogenous (i.e., they are not uncorrelated to past, present 
and future error terms). 
One possibility is to use the fixed effects (within-groups) transformation, which 
eliminates  i η . Unfortunately, this is biased for small samples because the new transformed 
(differenced) variables are correlated to the error term (see Bond, 2002). 
Our estimation procedure follows a simple idea: first a transformation is used to eliminate 
the unobserved fixed effect, then instruments are chosen for the endogenous variables in the 
transformed equation. 
The initial step is to first-difference equation (1) to remove the fixed effect   i η  and obtain 
) 1 , , 1 , , 2 , 1 , 1 , , ( ) ( ) ( − − − − − − + − + − = −
′
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i x x y y y y ε ε β α  
or 
t i t i t i t i x y y , , 1 , , ε β α Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ
′
− (2) 
Even though this eliminates the fixed effect, we still need to use instruments because: 
•    1 , − Δ t i y   is correlated to   t i, ε Δ  , since  1 , − t i y  is correlated to  1 , − t i ε   
•    t i x , Δ   is correlated to   t i, ε Δ  , since   t i x ,   is correlated to both     ,t i ε  and    1 , − t i ε   
We can use internal lagged instruments if we make the assumption that even though the 
independent variables are not “strictly exogenous,” they are “weakly exogenous.” This means 
that even though they may be correlated with past or current error terms, they are uncorrelated 
with future error terms.  
In particular,   49
•     1 , − t i y   is “predetermined” = correlated to past   s t i − , ε  , but uncorrelated to 
current   t i, ε  and future   s t i + , ε   for  s  1  
•    t i x ,    is “endogenous” = correlated to past  i,t−s and current  i,t , but 
uncorrelated to future  i,ts  for  s  1  
This means that predetermined and endogenous variables are uncorrelated to unanticipated 
shocks (future error terms), even though expected future dynamics may affect them.
42  
Given these assumptions, one possible set of instruments is to use lagged values of level 
variables like  2 , − t i y   to instrument for   1 , − Δ t i y   , and    2 , − t i x  to instrument for  t i x , Δ   
These are good instruments because: 
•  2 , − t i y   is correlated to   2 , 1 , 1 , − − − − = Δ t i t i t i y y y  , but uncorrelated to   1 , , , − − = Δ t i t i t i ε ε ε  given our 
assumption of weak exogeneity. 
•  2 , − t i x   is correlated to   1 , , , − − = Δ t i t i t i x x x  , but uncorrelated to   1 , , , − − = Δ t i t i t i ε ε ε  given our 
assumption of weak exogeneity. Note that here there has to be 2 lags at least, because  1 , − t i x  
may be correlated to  . 1 , − t i ε   
In fact, we could potentially use as many lags as we want for  3 t ≥ .  
However, these lagged variables could be invalid if there is high persistence in the series. 
For example, if a persistent increase in  2 , − t i y leads to a similar increase in  1 , − t i y , we would 
have 0 1 , ≈ Δ − t i y , which is uncorrelated to  2 , − t i y . This is particularly true for variables like 
political institutions, which have very small time-series variation.  
This leads to System GMM, which incorporates more instruments. Here, we need to make 
one further assumption: 
•  Even though  t i x ,  may be correlated to   i η  ,  t i x , Δ   is not correlated to  i η    .  
This allows us to use an extra set of moment conditions and use  1 , − Δ t i x  as instruments for  t i x ,  in 
the original level regression. This is a “stationarity assumption,” basically saying that deviations 
                                          
42 Another way to interpret the assumption of weak exogeneity is that a crisis in the past does not have an impact on 
growth that is independent from the effect through the contemporaneous crisis and all other independent variables 
included. If true, then we can use a lagged value of the crisis variable as an instrument for the contemporaneous 
crisis, because we do not need to use it as an instrument of itself. Otherwise it would be playing two roles, first as its 
own instrument to capture the lagged effect and then as an instrument of the contemporaneous endogenous crisis 
variable.   50
from long term trends  ) ( ,t i x Δ  are not correlated to country fixed effects. If we are willing to 
accept this assumption, we can estimate a System GMM, with both the level and difference 
equations.  
•  In the level equation (1) we use   1 , − Δ t i x  as instruments for  t i x ,  (same for 
1 , − t i y ), which is possible since it is assumed not to be correlated to  i η   
•  In the difference equation (2) we use    2 , − t i x  to instrument for   t i x , Δ   ( a s  
explained above) 
Note that we need to verify that  t i, ε Δ  is not 2nd order serially correlated, meaning   t i, ε Δ   is 
uncorrelated to   2 , − Δ t i ε  , which happens only if  t i, ε  is serially uncorrelated. (By construction, 
= Δ t i, ε   1 , , − − t i t i ε ε will be negatively serially correlated to  = Δ −1 ,t i ε      2 , 1 , − − − t i t i ε ε ). For this 
purpose we use the Arellano-Bond 2nd order serial correlation test  
Finally, another important specification test is the Hansen
43 test of overidentifying 
restrictions. The Hansen test has a null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions (a difference-in-
Sargan test is basically a Hansen test for a subset of instruments). Given that the validity of the 
instruments (moment conditions) is needed for the assumption of weak exogeneity, then the 
Hansen test is also a test of this assumption.  It is important to note that if there are too many 
instruments, the Hansen test may have weak power and p-value for this test will be close to 1. It 
is not an issue in our regressions, since we limit the number of lags used as instruments.  
For further reference on this estimators see Bond (2002), Roodman (2006 and 2007), and 





                                          
43 Equivalent to the Sargan test, but under heteroskedasticity.  